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A Game Theoretic Approach to Contracts
in Multiagent Systems
Guido Boella and Leendert van der Torre
Abstract—Contracts are used to create new interaction pos-
sibilities among agents, and they therefore play an important
role in the game theoretic analysis of agent interaction. We use
normative multiagent systems to model both the contracts and the
interactions. In particular, we formalize contracts as systems of
regulative and constitutive norms within a larger rule-governed
setting, and using recursive modelling we develop a game theory
where agents make contracts. We show how agents can modify the
behavior of normative systems by means of constitutive rules in
the contract changing these systems, and we illustrate how agents
use the game theory within contract negotiation in organizations.
Index Terms—Contracts, qualitative game theory, multiagent
systems, normative systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Autonomous agents negotiating deals on behalf of human
traders are essential in e-commerce and e-trading systems.
Many researchers focus their approaches on the game-theoretic
analysis of the interaction among negotiation agents to prove
macro-level properties like system stability (equilibrium) as
well as efficiency (Pareto-optimality). However, the interaction
structure in many multiagent systems is not completely fixed in
advance to preserve the autonomy of agents. For example, as
Dignum et al. [1] note, in (virtual) organizations the interaction
possibilities can be changed and negotiated. For this reason,
several approaches like [1]–[4] introduce the possibility for
agents to stipulate contracts. A contract can be defined as
a statement of intent regulating behavior among agents and
organizations. Contracts have been proposed to make explicit
how agents can change the interaction with and within the
organization, using the legal effects of contracts involving the
creation of obligations, permissions and new possibilities of
interaction. From a contractual perspective, organizations can
be seen as the possible sets of agreements for satisfying the
diverse interests of self interested agents [2].
Hanson and Milosevic [3] distinguish various phases in
the negotiation of contracts, like contract schema selection,
issue identification, negotiation of values of the issues agreed
upon, monitoring the performance of the contract, et cetera.
As Marsh suggests in the contract negotiation handbook [5],
a crucial point in the negotiation is the careful planning of
the moves during the bargaining. Accordingly, agents must
evaluate the effects of a contract during its negotiation both
when proposing and evaluating an offer. In particular, since the
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compliance of the agents to the contract cannot be taken for
granted, an agent must consider whether the other agents will
fulfill their commitments or not. To make a prediction about
the behavior of an agent it is necessary to consider also the
reaction of the normative system [6] acting as a coordinator
enforcing control by monitoring and sanctioning violations.
In this paper we develop a formal game-theoretic model
for autonomous agents negotiating contracts, which we model
as a normative multiagent system, that is, a “set of agents
[...] whose interactions can be regarded as norm-governed;
the norms prescribe how the agents ideally should and should
not behave [7].” It is based on a general conceptual model
formalizing contracts as so-called legal institutions, that is,
as sets of norms within a larger legal setting. In this way,
agents are made competent to determine the course of law
within the sphere of the contracts they are allowed to create. To
model the interaction among agents and the normative system
in this game-theoretic setting, we apply the agent metaphor
to normative systems and therefore model the interaction
among agents and their normative system analogously to the
interaction among real agents.
We define games using recursive modelling. Violation
games model an agent deliberating whether to violate a norm
or not, where the agent recursively models the normative
system to predict whether its behavior counts as a violation
and will be sanctioned. The set of possible behaviors includes
the possibility of making contracts to change the agent’s
normative position based on constitutive rules that change
the normative system. Negotiation games model an agent
deliberating whether it will propose or accept a contract,
thereby recursively modelling the other agent to find out
whether it will violate the norms in the contract. In this
sense, negotiation games add a recursive level of reasoning
to violation games. We illustrate how agents can reason in the
game theory using an example from international trade.
This paper does not address the problem of equilibrium
analysis in the proposed game theory or the negotiation
protocol to obtain an agreement. Instead we examine the
impact of contracts on the games played by the agents and
how the agents reason about the legal effects of contracts.
The layout of this paper is as follows. In Section II we
discuss regulative and constitutive rules, legal institutions
and how agents modify the behavior of normative systems
using contracts. In Section III we discuss the foundations
of our model and in Section IV we introduce our formal
model applying the agent metaphor to normative systems. In
Section V we present recursive modelling, the games which
can be played with contracts, and an example illustrating how
agents use the game theory for contracting.
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II. CONTRACTS AS LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
Most formalizations of normative systems identify norms
with regulative norms like obligations, prohibitions and per-
missions. However, Searle [8] argues that there is a distinction
between two types of rules.
“Some rules regulate antecedently existing forms of
behaviour. For example, the rules of polite table
behaviour regulate eating, but eating exists indepen-
dently of these rules. Some rules, on the other hand,
do not merely regulate an antecedently existing
activity called playing chess; they, as it were, create
the possibility of or define that activity. The activity
of playing chess is constituted by action in accor-
dance with these rules. The institutions of marriage,
money, and promising are like the institutions of
baseball and chess in that they are systems of such
constitutive rules or conventions” ( [8], p. 131).
For Searle, regulative and constitutive norms are related via
institutional facts like marriage, money and private property.
They emerge from an independent ontology of “brute” phys-
ical facts through constitutive rules of the form “such and
such an X counts as Y in context C” where X is any object
satisfying certain conditions and Y is a label that qualifies X
as being something of an entirely new sort. E.g., “X counts
as a presiding official in a wedding ceremony”, “this bit of
paper counts as a five euro bill” and “this piece of land counts
as somebody’s private property”. Regulative norms refer to
these institutional facts. E.g., consider a society which believes
that a field fenced by an agent counts as the fact that the
field is the agent’s property. The fence is a physical “brute”
fact, while being a property is an institutional fact. Regulative
norms forbidding trespassing refer to the abstract concept of
property rather than to fenced fields.
Moreover, the philosopher of law Ruiter [9] shows, from the
legal point of view, that legal effects of actions of the members
of a legal system are complex and contracts do not concern
only the regulative aspects of a legislation or the constitutive
part of it. Rather, contracts are legal institutions: “systems of
[regulative and constitutive] rules that provide frameworks for
social action within larger rule-governed settings” [9]. This
systemic view of legal institutions emerged only recently in
legal studies, since legal positivism [10] mainly focused on
the regulative aspects of law and its justification.
To formalize contracts as legal institutions, we have to
extend Searle’s model. Searle’s analysis of constitutive rules
has focused mainly on the attribution of a new functional
status to entities like marriages, money, and property. Searle’s
idea is that constitutive rules “create the possibility or define
that activity.” In our model the role of constitutive rules is
not limited to the creation of an activity and the construction
of new abstract legal categories. Constitutive norms specify
besides the creation of legal categories also the evolution of
the system. The normative system itself specifies by means
of constitutive rules how its state can be changed, who can
change it, and the limits of the possible changes. In this
way, complex normative systems achieve a legal regime that
includes rules conferring legal powers on participants: an
agent is turned into a “private legislator” (Hart [10]): “he is
made competent to determine the course of law within the
sphere of his contracts, trusts, wills and other structures [...]
which he is enabled to build”. Agents become able to design
“relatively independent institutional legal orders within the
comprehensive legal orders” (Ruiter [9]).
The regime of a legal institution can be defined as the set of
legal consequences that flow from the existence of the insti-
tution. However, the meaning of “legal consequences” differs
from what is normally understood by the term. Usually, since
obligations have a conditional nature, when the condition of
an obligation is satisfied, as a legal consequence the addressee
of the obligation is categorically obliged to fulfill it. Legal
institutions, like contracts, marriages and properties, refer to a
different kind of legal consequences. E.g., the legal rule “in a
marriage parents have the reciprocal obligation to take care of
and support their children” is not a conditional obligation. It
expresses the fact that only when a legal institution of marriage
between Amy and Bob is created, the obligation is created that
Amy and Bob take care and support their children. The same
happens with the legal institution of contracts. When a contract
comes into existence it creates obligations for the agents, i.e.,
new regulative norms which the normative system considers
as its own. E.g., the Italian Civil Code art. 1173 (sources of
obligations) specifies that obligations are created by contracts
and art. 1372 (efficacy of contracts) that a contract has the
strength of law (a contract is an agreement among two or more
agents to regulate a juridical relationship about valuables ex
art. 1321).
Therefore, contracts as legal institutions bring with them
also constitutive rules creating not only new institutional
facts, but also new obligations. In this way, it is possible
to specify in a contract new procedures for the interaction
among agents, to specify the evolution of the contract and
how new obligations are created at a later stage. As Dignum
et al. [1] notice, a contract specifies the events that alter the
status of the contract. It is necessary to specify an interaction
structure which indicates the possibilities of an agent and the
consequences of its choices. The contract must specify how to
proceed if a norm is violated and what the violator is expected
to do. E.g., if a payment deadline is not respected, then the
agent may be obliged to pay a double fee. Since we model
contracts as legal institutions, this rule is not a conditional
obligation, but it is an obligation created by an event specified
in the contract, in the same way as the contract itself can create
obligations. This is possible, because we consider a contract as
a legal institution, which may be seen as a normative system
inside the main normative system. As a normative system it
specifies who has the power to introduce obligations.
To illustrate our model we use in this paper an example
of Gordijn and Tan [11] about contracts inside a trade orga-
nization. In this example, the contracts are legal institutions
within the larger context of legislation of international trade
(the UN Convention on International Multimodal Transport of
Goods, CIMTG). Gordijn and Tan show how the problem of
trust between two agents exchanging goods for money can be
solved by means of contracts offered by international trade
organizations.
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III. FOUNDATIONS OF OUR MODEL
Inspired by the game-theoretic approach to obligations of
Boella and Lesmo [12], we propose a logical multiagent
framework for normative reasoning based on the philosophical
foundations on strategic interaction in the work of sociologist
Goffman [13]. “Strategic interaction” here means, according to
Goffman, taking into consideration the actions of other agents:
“When an agent considers which course of ac-
tion to follow, before he takes a decision, he de-
picts in his mind the consequences of his action
for the other involved agents, their likely reac-
tion, and the influence of this reaction on his own
welfare” [13, p.12].
Goffman sees norms as producing a form of strategic interac-
tion between the agent and the normative system, and gives
a game-theoretic interpretation of obligations. In a normative
system, “the enforcement power is taken from mother nature
and invested in a social office specialized for this purpose,
namely a body of officials empowered to make final judge-
ments and to institute payments” [13, p.115]. Such a game is
unusual, since “the judges and their actions will not be fully
fixed in the environment, many unnatural things are possible.
[...] the payment for a player’s move ceases to be automatic but
is decided on and made by the judges” [13, p.115]. Clearly, this
approach is different from recent logical studies about norms
and contracts based on modal logic like so-called deontic logic,
see Section VI.
However, there are some problems to use Goffman’s strate-
gic interaction to develop a game theoretic approach to con-
tracts. In particular, classical decision and game theory have
been criticized for their assumptions of ideality. Several alter-
natives have been proposed that take the bounded rationality
of decision makers into account. For example, Newell [14]
and others develop theories in artificial intelligence using
the notion of goal. Agent theory replaces probabilities and
utilities by informational (knowledge, belief) and motivational
attitudes (goal, desire), and the decision rule by a process of
deliberation. Bratman [15] further extends such theories with
intentions for sequential decisions and norms for multiagent
decision making (see the discussion in Section VI). Moreover,
Gmytrasiewitcz and Durfee [16] replace the equilibria analysis
in classical game theory by recursive modelling. It considers
the practical limitations of agents in realistic settings such as
acquiring knowledge and reasoning so that an agent can build
only a finite nesting of models about other agents’ decisions.
“In order to solve its own decision-making situation,
the agent needs an idea of what the other agents are
likely to do. It can arrive at it by representing what
it knows about the other agents’ decision-making
situations, thus modelling them in terms of their own
payoff matrices. The fact that other agents could also
be modelling others, including the original agent,
leads to a recursive nesting of models.”
Moreover, Goffman does not consider contracts, though his
idea that the enforcement power is invested in a social office
empowered to make final judgements and to institute payments
is even more relevant when we consider besides norms also
contracts. Contracts are used by agents to implement the
agreements resulting from their negotiations and to change
their normative situation. Social order in a multiagent system
emerges from the contracts resulting from negotiations about
the rights and duties of participants, rather than being given
in advance. Moreover, as discussed in Section II, contracts are
legal institutions, i.e., “systems of [regulative and constitutive]
rules that provide frameworks for social action within larger
rule-governed settings” [9], In our case, the larger setting is
represented by a normative system which establishes the set
of possible contracts. For this reason it is necessary to address
the problem of contracts being aware of the peculiarities of
legal institutions.
We emphasize here two properties of our model. First, legal
institutions contain control procedures, which are policies and
procedures that help to ensure that management directives are
carried out [17], because, intentionally or not, an agent may
fail to comply with the contract. For example, as suggested by
Milosevic and Dromey [18], the specification given in a con-
tract differs significantly from a computational specification
in the expected degree of inconsistency. As Jones and Carmo
observe, “importantly, the norms allow for the possibility that
actual behavior may at times deviate from the ideal, i.e., that
violations of obligations, or of agents’ rights, may occur” [7].
We therefore represent norms as soft constraints, which are
used in detective control systems where violations can be
detected (you can enter a train without a ticket, but you may
be checked and sanctioned), instead of hard constraints [19],
which are restricted to preventative control systems that are
built such that violations are impossible (you cannot enter a
metro station without a ticket). Detective control is the result
of the action of an agent, and consequently it is subject to
errors and can be influenced by the actions of other agents.
Secondly, our model allows to analyze in detail both the
decisions of agents and the creation of new regulative and
constitutive norms under existing obligations. For example,
Marsh [5] highlights that also the existing obligations and
commitments of the agents play a role in contract negotiation,
as well as the procedures they have to follow, in that they
constrain both the possibility to propose and accept bids.
Consequently, our model cannot only be used for the initial
creation of the normative system with its contracts, but also
for its evolution.
In our running example of contracts in a trade organization,
there are several agents. On the one hand the seller does not
want to ship the goods onto the carrier’s vessel without first
receiving payment from the buyer. On the other hand the buyer
does not want to pay the seller before the goods have been
shipped. To solve this deadlock situation banks introduced
the letter of credit: an agreement that the bank of the buyer
will arrange the payment for the seller as soon as the seller
can prove to the bank that he has shipped the goods. The
bill of lading is issued by the carrier in return for the goods
that he received from the seller. According to Article 10 of
the CIMTG the bill of lading as shipment document reliably
indicates that the goods have been shipped in international
trade procedures. This is not a regulative norm, but a new
constitutive rule added by the contract.
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IV. THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF CONTRACTS
The conceptual model of the normative multiagent system
is visualized in Figure 1. This figure can be interpreted using
classical set theory. A box  stands for a concept and is
interpreted as a set. The lines and arrows — and → are
interpreted as arbitrary relations over the sets they connect.
A special relation is −−, which is interpreted as the subset
relation over the two concepts it connects: the first set is a
subset of the second set. Finally, − says that the singleton
set o is an element of SA. Dashed boxes and lines have the
same interpretation, but refer to the normative aspects of the
model of multiagent systems. These four elements occur in
most conceptual modelling languages, besides other elements.
For example, in class diagrams in the unified modelling
language (UML),  is a class interpreted as a set of objects,
— and → are associations among classes, −− is the “is-
a” relation or subsumption relation, and − is “part-of” or
aggregation relation.
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Fig. 1. Conceptual model of normative multiagent systems.
The intuitive reading of these concepts and the logical
structure of the relations is detailed in the definitions below. In
Section IV-A we explain the conceptual model of multiagent
systems, and in Section IV-B we extend it to a normative
multiagent systems by introducing violations. In Section IV-C
we define how agents can change the normative system by
means of constitutive rules by formalizing the constitutive
rules as belief rules of the normative system. Finally in
Section IV-D we define obligations in terms of desires and
goals, and in Section IV-E contracts.
A. Multiagent systems
We first introduce the structural concepts and their relations.
A set of propositional variables X describes the different
aspects of the world, and we extend it to literals built out
of X (Lit(X)) to consider also the absence of a state of affairs.
Rules built out of the literals (Rul(X)) describe the relations
among the propositional variables. A rule l1 ∧ . . . ∧ ln → l
is a pair of a set of literals built from X and a literal built
from X . The left hand side is called antecedent or body, and
the right hand side is called consequent or head. Rules are
used to represent the relations among propositional variables
existing in the agent’s mental attitudes.
Definition 1: Let X be a set of variables. The set of literals
built from X , written as Lit(X), is X ∪ {¬x | x ∈ X}, and
the set of rules built from X , written as Rul(X), is defined by
2Lit(X) × Lit(X), the set of pairs of a set of literals built
from X and a literal built from X . A rule is written as
{l1, . . . , ln} → l, we also write l1 ∧ . . . ∧ ln → l and when
n = 0 we write  → l. Moreover, for x ∈ X we write ∼x
for ¬x and ∼¬x for x.
In the multiagent system, we consider various sorts of
agents. Besides real agents RA (either human or artificial)
we consider also socially constructed agents SA like groups,
normative systems and organizations. These latter agents do
not exist in the usual sense of the term. Rather, they exist only
as they are attributed mental attitudes by real agents. The two
sets of agents are disjoint and partition the set of agents A.
The mental attitudes attributed to agents consist of be-
liefs B, desires D and goals G. A mental description func-
tion MD associates a rule in Rul(X) with each belief, desire
and goal [20]. We introduce priority relations to resolve con-
flicts among motivations, i.e., desires and goals. A function ≥
associates with an agent a transitive and reflexive relation on
the powerset of the motivations containing at least the subset
relation. Moreover, different mental attitudes are attributed to
agents by the agent description relation AD. It associates with
each agent a set of beliefs, desires and goals. Moreover, AD
associates also agents with agents, because normative systems
and organizations exist only as they are described as agents
by other agents. Formally, a socially constructed agent b ∈ SA
exists only as some other agents attribute mental attitudes to
it: ∀b ∈ SA ∃a ∈ A : b ∈ AD(a).
Multiagent systems also contain concepts concerning infor-
mational aspects. First of all, the variables whose truth value
are determined by an agent (decision variables) are distin-
guished from those which are not directly determined by the
agent (P , the parameters using Lang et al. [21]’s terminology).
Besides, “institutional facts” I are states of affairs existing
only inside normative systems and organizations. As discussed
in Section II, Searle [22] suggests that money, properties, and
marriages exist only as part of social reality. Since we model
social reality by means of the attribution of mental attitudes
to social entities, institutional facts exist at least in the beliefs
of these socially constructed agents. We associate to each
agent a subset of X by extending further the agent description
relation AD. Moreover, the set of institutional facts I is a
subset of the parameters.
Definition 2 (MAS): A multiagent system is a tuple
〈RA, SA, X,B,D,G,AD,MD,≥, I〉, where:
• the real agents RA, socially constructed agents SA, vari-
ables X , beliefs B, desires D, and goals G are six finite
disjoint sets. We write A = RA ∪ SA for all agents, and
M = D ∪G for motivations.
• an agent description AD : A → 2A∪X∪B∪D∪G is a
complete function that maps each agent to other agents
that exist in its profile, to a set of variables (its decision
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variables), and to its beliefs, desires and goals. We assume
that there are no cycles in the mapping of agents to
agents. For each agent a ∈ A, we write Aa for A∩AD(a),
Xa for X∩AD(a), et cetera. We write P = X \∪a∈AXa
for the parameters.
• the mental description MD : B ∪ D ∪ G → Rul(X) is
a complete function from the sets of beliefs, desires and
goals to the set of rules built from X . For S ⊆ B∪D∪G,
we write MD(S) = {MD(m) | m ∈ S}. Moreover, we
write m x → y for: m such that MD(m) = x → y.
• a priority relation ≥: A → 2M × 2M is a function
from agents to a transitive and reflexive relation on the
powerset of the motivations containing at least the subset
relation. We write ≥a for ≥ (a).
• the institutional facts I ⊆ P are parameters.
Example 1 illustrates a highly simplified version of the
running example as a multiagent system. In conceptual models
used in practice as well as in the more detailed example later
in this section we use meaningful names, but in Example 1
we use single letters to save space. The example describes the
transaction of exchanging goods for money in terms of the
motivations of the agents and the organization.
Example 1: 〈RA, SA, X,B,D,G,AD,MD,≥, I〉 with
RA = {a,b}, SA = {o}, P = {p, q, r, s, t}, I = {r, s, t} and
X \ P , B, D, G, AD, MD and ≥ are implicitly given by the
following table:
a b o
A o o −
X x1 x2, x3 x4, x5
B b1 x2 → p b3 x3 → p
b2 x4 → r b4 x4 → r b5 x4 → r
D d1  → p − −
G − g1  → x1 g2 p → x1
≥ d1 > g1 > g2 g1 > d1 > g2 g2 > d1 = g1
This table should be read as follows. There are three agents,
two real agents a and b, and one socially constructed organi-
zation o. Agent a is a buyer with the desire d1 that it receives
the goods (MD(d1) =  → p), agent b is a seller with the
goal g1 that agent a pays for the goods (MD(g1) =  → x1),
and the organization has a goal g2 that received goods are paid
for. The optimal solution is that agent a decides x1 and agent b
decides x2. Agent a and b disagree about the fact whether it
is the decision x2 or x3 which leads to p. All agents agree
that decision x4 leads to institutional fact r. Finally, only a
fragment of the priority relation is given, because it is only
given for singleton motivations, whereas it is defined over sets
of motivations. It says that the agents give highest priority to
their own motivations, but they are social in the sense that
they incorporate the other agent’s motivations.
The table can be extended to deal with more detailed
motivations in the obvious way. However, the example already
illustrates a drawback of using only multiagent systems to
describe the example, because there is no notion of obliga-
tion, violation, sanction or contract. We therefore introduce
normative multiagent systems and extend the example below.
B. Normative multiagent systems
Boella and Lesmo [12] formalize the relation between mul-
tiagent systems and normative systems by attributing mental
states to agents as well as to normative systems. Thus, a nor-
mative system can metaphorically be considered as a socially
constructed agent. The use of the agent metaphor may be
seen as an instance of Dennett’s intentional stance [23] and is
inspired by the interpretation of normative multiagent systems
as dynamic social orders. According to Castelfranchi [24],
a social order is a pattern of interactions among interfering
agents “such that it allows the satisfaction of the interests of
some agent”, like a shared goal or a value that is good for
(almost) all the agents. For example, the interests may include
the avoidance of accidents or a fair society. In this approach
the obligations of the agents can be formalized as desires
or goals of the normative system. This representation may
be paraphrased as “your wish is my command”, because the
desires or wishes of the normative system are the obligations
or commands of the real agents. The agents attribute to the
normative system also the ability to autonomously enforce the
conformity of the agents to the norms by means of sanctions.
The advantage of the agent metaphor is that game theory
can be used to describe the interaction among agents and the
normative system in terms of games. For example, an agent
considers whether its actions will lead to a reaction of the
normative system such as sanctions. An agent can understand
when it can evade sanctions by for example ensuring that the
normative system does not observe its behavior, or by bribing
the system. Moreover, a legislator can play a game with the
normative system and another agent to see whether a new
norm it introduces will be complied with, and which kind
of sanctions it has to associate with the norm to achieve the
desired behavior. In Section V we give an example of a game
in contracting.
A normative multiagent system contains a normative sys-
tem o ∈ SA, which we formalize as a socially constructed
agent. Moreover, it contains a norm (violation) description
V : A×Lit(X) → Xo∪P , a function from agents and literals
to the decision variables of the normative system together with
the parameters. We write Va(x) for the variable representing
that x ∈ Lit(X) is a violation by agent a ∈ A.
Definition 3: A normative multiagent system is a tuple
〈RA, SA, X,B,D,G,AD,MD,≥, I,o, V 〉 extending a multia-
gent system with:
• a socially constructed agent o ∈ SA representing the
normative system, such that for all real agents a ∈ RA,
we have o ∈ Aa.
• a (partial) function V : A×Lit(X) → Xo∪P from agents
and literals to the decision variables of the normative
system and the parameters. We write Va(x) for V (a, x).
Example 2 (Continued): The socially constructed agent o
in Example 1 is now interpreted as an organization constituting
the normative system. Moreover, assume that V is defined as
follows. Va(¬x1) = s, Vb(¬p) = t, and Vx(y) = undefined
for all other values of x and y. Thus, if s is the case, then ¬x1
is recognized as a violation of agent a, and if t is the case,
then ¬p is recognized as a violation of agent b.
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C. Counts-as conditionals and self-modification
Socially constructed agents like normative systems and or-
ganizations are able to change themselves to adapt to new sit-
uations. Self modifying normative multiagent systems contain
additions to the agent description, also known as expansions,
which are defined as + : A × (B ∪ D ∪ G) → X , i.e.,
as mappings from mental attitudes to propositional variables
for each agent. Deletions (also known as contractions) can
be defined analogously, and revisions can be defined as a
combination of a deletion and an addition. In this paper we
do not consider the formalization of deletion and revision, nor
any other update to the normative multiagent system, to keep
the formal machinery to a minimum.
Since institutional facts I , and among them the additions
to the mental state attributed to the normative system, are
parameters not directly controlled by the agent, we use belief
rules of the normative system to express how they can be
made true. Rules concerning beliefs about institutional facts
are called constitutive rules and represent the “counts-as”
relations (CA) introduced by Searle [22] (see Section II). We
do not define CA in terms of the other concepts, but we
include CA in the extended normative multiagent systems, to
cater for the possibility that there are also belief rules of the
normative system not being counts-as conditionals, but still
implying institutional facts.
Definition 4 (SNMAS): A self modifying normative
multiagent system is represented by a tuple
〈RA, SA, X,B,D,G,AD,MD,≥, I,o, V,+,CA〉 extending a
normative multiagent system with:
• Additions are a partial function + : A×(B∪D∪G) → X ,
such that for all m ∈ B ∪M , if +o(m) is defined, then
+o(m) ∈ I . We write +a(m) for +(a,m).
• Counts-as conditionals CA ⊆ Bo or constitutive norms
are beliefs of the normative system o, such that consti-
tutive rules CR = MD(CA) are rules whose heads are
institutional facts in I .
• Constitutive norms with legal effects (LN) are the beliefs
of the normative system of which the heads of the rules
LR = MD(LN) are additions.
The update of a SNMAS by a set of literals L ⊆ Lit(X) is
AD′a = ADa ∪ {m | +a(m) ∈ L}.
Definition 5 (Counts-as): Given a self modi-
fying normative multiagent system SNMAS as
〈RA, SA, X,B,D,G,AD,MD,≥, I,o, V,+,CA〉, we write
SNMAS |= counts-aso(Y, p) if Y ⊆ Lit(X), p ∈ I and
∃m ∈ CA such that MD(m) = Y → p.
The running example illustrates counts-as conditionals.
Example 3 (Continued): If CA = {b5}, then we have
SNMAS |= counts-aso(x4, r). Moreover, if there is a b6 ∈ B
not associated with any agent, with MD(b6) = ¬p → Vb(¬p),
and +o(b6) = r, +x(y) = undefined for other values of x
and y, then b5 ∈ LN is a constitutive norm with legal
effects, and we have SNMAS |= counts-aso(x4,+o(b6)). If the
normative system decides x4, then it counts as the addition of
the rule ¬p → Vb(¬p), i.e., that if the goods are not received,
then it is a violation of agent b.
D. Obligations
Before we can define contracts, we must introduce obli-
gations. We consider obligations of agent a only, which are
defined in terms of goals and desires of the addressee of the
norm a and of a normative system o. Obligations of agent b
can be defined analogously.
The definition of obligation contains several clauses. The
first clause says that the obligation is in the content of the
desires and in the goals of normative system o (“your wish is
my command”). The second and third clause can be read as
“the absence of x is considered as a violation”. The association
of obligations with violations is inspired by Anderson’s re-
duction of deontic logic to alethic modal logic [25]. The third
clause says that the normative system desires that there are
no violations. The fourth and fifth clause relate violations to
sanctions and assume that normative system o is motivated to
apply sanctions only as long as there is a violation; otherwise
the norm would have no effect. Finally, for the same reason,
we assume in the last clause that the agent does not like the
sanction.
Definition 6 (Obligation): Let SNMAS =
〈RA, SA, X,B,D,G,AD,MD,≥, I,o, V,+,CA〉 be a self
modifying normative multiagent system. Agent a ∈ A is
obliged to decide to do x ∈ Lit(Xa ∪ P ) with sanction
s ∈ Lit(Xo ∪ P ) if Y ⊆ Lit(Xa ∪ P ) in SNMAS, written as
SNMAS |= Oao(x, s|Y ), if and only if:
1) Y → x ∈ MD(Do) ∩ MD(Go): if normative system o
believes Y , then it desires and has as a goal that x.
2) Y ∪ {∼x} → Va(∼x) ∈ MD(Do) ∩MD(Go): if nor-
mative system o believes Y and ∼x, then it has the goal
and the desire Va(∼x): to recognize it as a violation by
agent a.
3)  → ¬Va(∼x) ∈ MD(Do): normative system o desires
that there are no violations.
4) Y ∪{Va(∼x)} → s ∈ MD(Do)∩MD(Go): if normative
system o believes Y and decides Va(∼x), then it desires
and has as a goal that it sanctions agent a with s.
5) Y → ∼s ∈ MD(Do): if normative system o believes Y ,
then it desires not to sanction, ∼s. This desire of the
normative system expresses that it only sanctions in case
of violation.
6) Y → ∼s ∈ MD(Da): if agent a believes Y , then it
desires ∼ s, which expresses that it does not like to
be sanctioned.
The following example illustrates an obligation of agent a.
To increase readability of our running example, from now on
we use long names for variables. We use pay instead of x1, and
we write shipped for an institutional fact following from x2.
Example 4 (Cont.): SNMAS |= Oao(pay, san|shipped),
agent a is obliged to pay (pay ∈ Xa) in case the requested
good has been shipped (shipped ∈ I) or else it is sanctioned
with san ∈ Lit(Xo), if:
g3, d2 shipped→ pay ∈ Go, Do
g4, d3 shipped ∧ ¬pay→ Va(¬pay) ∈ Go, Do
d4  → ¬Va(¬pay) ∈ Do
g5, d5 shipped ∧ Va(¬pay) → san ∈ Go, Do
d6, d7 shipped→ ¬san ∈ Do, Da
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E. Contracts
The creation of a contract is represented by an institutional
fact c ∈ I . The creation of the contract c is introduced as
an intermediary between the agreement and its legal effects,
because it allows decoupling the conditions of the creation of
the institutional facts from additions of its legal effects. For
example, consider a contract c created by the signatures of
two agents. Using the decoupling a new way of creating the
contract by means of an electronic signature can be specified,
maintaining the same rules specifying its legal effects. Since a
contract counts as several additions, c works as an abstraction.
The contract unifies all its legal effects, rather than connecting
the signatures of the agents directly with the additions.
In our model contracts change the norms of a normative
system or organization according to what is specified by
the normative systems itself, because they are part of the
beliefs attributed to the system. A contract is created only
if there is some fact – either a brute fact in the world or
another institutional fact – counting as c for the normative
system o. The effect of creating a contract is to modify the
mental attitudes of the normative system. Usually, it adds some
rules to the beliefs Bo, the desires Do, or the goals Go by
an addition +o(m) where m ∈ B ∪ M . The additions are
institutional facts: they are made true only if the normative
system o believes that they are made true by the creation of the
contract. E.g., b ∈ CA ⊆ Bo such that MD(b) = c → +o(m)
is a constitutive rule read as “c counts as the addition +o(m).”
In summary, a contract is defined as follows.
Definition 7 (Contract): Given a self modifying sys-
tem 〈RA, SA, X,B,D,G,AD,MD,≥, I,o, V,+,CA〉 called
SNMAS, we write SNMAS |= contract(c, E|Y ) where
E ⊆ {i ∈ I | ∃m : i = +(m)} and Y ⊆ Lit(X) if:
1) c ∈ I is an institutional fact representing that the
contract has been created.
2) SNMAS |= counts-aso(Y, c): Y counts as the creation of
the contract.
3) SNMAS |= counts-aso(c,+o(m)) for each +o(m) in E:
the creation of the contract counts as the set of addi-
tions E.
Our running example about contracts in trade organizations
illustrates how a contract can create the obligation to pay
for shipped goods. The contract is created by a signature of
agent a, and has as legal effects three goals and desires.
Example 5: [Continued] Assume that agent a signing the
contract, represented by sign ∈ Xa, is a sufficient condition
for the contract c ∈ I to be created. Moreover, assume that
SNMAS contains d4, d6 and d7 of Example 4, representing
that agent a does not like to be sanctioned and organization o
does not like violations and sanctions. Finally, assume that
the creation c of the contract achieves the following effects
on the mental attitudes of the organization o. It adds the goal
and desire that shipped goods are paid for (g3, d2), the goal
and desire to consider the lack of payment for shipped goods
as a violation (g4, d3), and the goal and desire to sanction
violations (g5, d5).
Under these assumptions, the creation of the obligation to
pay for shipped goods as part of the contract created by the
signature is represented by SNMAS |= contract(c, E|sign),
when the following holds.
E = {+o(g3),+o(d2),+o(g4),+o(d3),+o(g5),+o(d5)},
SNMAS |= counts-aso(sign, c) (b7 sign→ c ∈ Bo) and,
SNMAS |= counts-aso(c,+o(m)) for each +o(m) in E:
{ b8 c → +o(g3), b9 c → +o(d2),
b10 c → +o(g4), b11 c → +o(d3),
b12 c → +o(g5), b13 c → +o(d5) } ⊆ Bo
The following example illustrates that the contract can
create a counts-as conditional specifying an institutional fact
to be used in the interaction. The contract specifies that a
document called bill-of-lading counts as the institutional fact
that the goods have been shipped.
Example 6 (Continued): Assume that the contract specifies
that the fact that the good has been shipped is an institutional
fact shipped ∈ I , which holds if there is some document
like the so-called bill of lading (bill ∈ P ) issued by a
third party [11]. With this addition of the contract we have
SNMAS |= contract(c, E ∪ {+o(b14}|sign): the constitutive
rule b15 c → +o(b14) ∈ Bo creates another constitutive rule
MD(b14) = bill → shipped, which is added to the beliefs of
the organization o by the addition +o(b14) as a consequence
of the contract c.
We could also add the other agents to the example, such
as the trusted third party in the above example, or the shipper
and the banks. Moreover, due to the uniform representation
of facts and the creations of norms, these constitutive norms
can be nested to formalize arbitrarily complex creations. As
Searle [22] observes, this nesting of counts-as conditionals
leads to the complexity of social reality in which we live. For
example, Example 5 and 6 illustrates that constitutive rules
created by contracts can eventually introduce new obligations
and new constitutive rules. In this way a contract can specify
how new obligations may arise during the interaction of the
agents. Likewise, contract frames can be defined as contracts
describing the creation of other contracts.
Example 7 (Continued): Assume that if an agent does not
pay the fee for a shipped good, it is obliged to pay a double
sum of money (pay2): Oao(pay2, san2 | ) [1]. This obligation
is not a preexisting conditional obligation: it is created as a
legal consequence of an event, the sanction san for not having
paid the fee. The sanction san, in this case, rather than being a
direct punishment for agent a, counts as the action of creating
a second obligation. Note that this obligation does not exist
until the normative system recognizes a violation and applies
the sanction san. This part of the contract is thus represented
by the constitutive rules creating further constitutive rules
about the creation of goals and desires (where san2 ∈ Xo
is a sanction both feared by agent a and not desired by
organization o). E.g., some of the clauses of the obligation
are as follows.
b16 c → +o(b19 san→ +o(g6  → pay2))
b17 c → +o(b20 san→ +o(g7 ¬pay2 → Va(¬pay2))),
b18 c → +o(b21 san→ +o(g8 Va(¬pay2) → san2))
Due to space limitations, in the following we restrict our-
selves to the creation of the obligation in Example 5 and the
creation of the counts-as conditional in Example 6.
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V. GAMES WITH CONTRACTS
In this section we define violation games in which an agent
recursively models the normative system. Violation games are
the simplest and most frequent kind of games and involve
only two agents. Negotiation games in which an agent models
another agent recursively modelling the normative system, can
be defined in our conceptual model of normative multiagent
systems too. More complex games like negotiation games
extend violation games with additional levels of recursion.
A. Recursive modeling
The game theory is based on an agent decision model that
uses belief rules to calculate the effects of decisions, and desire
and goal rules to evaluate decisions. This is also where the
updates of the rules are incorporated. Since we only consider
rule additions and no other updates of the normative multiagent
system, we assume that all relevant beliefs, desires and goals
together with their priorities are already present in the system,
such that we only have to adapt the agent description AD.
To define the effects of decisions, we first address the
question how rules are applied such that the normative system
is modified. Even without counts-as conditionals, there are
several ways to define the application of rules. This is studied,
for example, by Makinson and van der Torre using so-called
input/output logics [26], where the input of a set of propo-
sitional formulas produces as output a set of propositional
formulas using a set of rules expressed as pairs of propositional
formulas. Here we use so-called reusable output, where the
input is not necessarily part of the output, rules can be
applied one after the other, and without so-called reasoning by
cases. The following definition extends reusable output logic
to incorporate a way to deal with additions. Instead of working
with a fixed set of rules, at every step of the calculation of
outi the set of rules Ri can be updated too. The output of
applying a set of rules R on a set of literals S with additions
E is written as out(S,R,E).
Definition 8 (Applying rules): The set of rule additions de-
fined on X and I , written as Add(I,X) = I × Rul(X), is
the set of all pairs of institutional facts and rules. We define
out : 2Lit(X) × 2Rul(X) × 2Add(I,X) → 2Lit(X) as a function
from a set of literals, a set of rules and a set of rule additions to
a set of literals. out(S,R,E) is the closure of a set of literals S
under the rules R updated by rule additions E.
• R0(S,R,E) = R
• out0(S,R,E) = ∅
• Rk+1(S,R,E) = Rk(S,R,E) ∪
{r ∈ Rul(X)|(i, r) ∈ E and i ∈ S ∪ outk(S,R,E)}
• outk+1(S,R,E) = outk(S,R,E) ∪
{l|L → l ∈ Rk(S,R,E) and L ⊆ S ∪ outk(S,R,E)}
• out(S,R,E) = ∪∞o outk(S,R,E)
Decisions of agents are sets of literals built from decision
variables which do not imply a contradiction. The input/output
logic is used in the game theory to define the closure of
a decision under a set of belief rules. When calculating the
effects of decisions, the rule additions are the inverse of the
addition function + mapped to rule descriptions. We describe
the new belief rules of agent a as additions EBa . We exclude
the cases in which agent a makes a decision which normative
system o does not hold possible, since we do not incorporate
how normative system o revises its beliefs in case of such a
surprise.
Definition 9 (Decisions): Let the set of belief additions of
agent a be EBa = {(i,MD(b)) | b ∈ B,+a(b) = i}, the
belief extension of agent a of a set of literals S ⊆ Lit(X) be
S ∪ out(S,Ba, EBa ), and analogously for normative system o.
The set of decision profiles ∆ is the set of sets δ = δa∪δo with
δa ⊆ Lit(Xa) and δo ⊆ Lit(Xo) such that the belief extensions
of agent a and of normative system o do not contain a variable
and its negation.
The logic is illustrated in an extension of Example 3.
Example 8 (Continued): The effects of the beliefs of a are
out(Ba, {x4,¬p}, EBa ) = {r = +o(b6), s = Vb(¬p)}: if the
normative system decides x4 and the goods are not received,
then it is a violation.
We assume that agent a only considers its own motivations
(and is in this sense selfish), which can be relaxed in the
obvious way, and that normative system o considers its own
motivations including the new rules. The unfulfilled motiva-
tions of decision profile δ = δa ∪ δo are the motivations
whose body is part of the closure of the decision under the
belief rules but whose head is not. Given a decision δa, a
decision δo is optimal for normative system o if it minimizes
the unfulfilled motivational attitudes in Do and Go according
to the ≥o relation. The decision of agent a is more complex.
When agent a takes its decision δa it minimizes its unfulfilled
motivational attitudes. But when it considers these attitudes, it
must not only consider its decision δa and the consequences
of this decision. It must consider also the decision δo of
the normative system o and its consequences, for example
that it is sanctioned by normative system o. So agent a
recursively considers which decision normative system o will
take depending on its different decisions δa.
Definition 10 (Recursive modelling): Let Sa(δ) and So(δ)
be the belief extensions of decision profile δ for agent a
and o respectively, and unfulfilled motivations of agent a and
normative system o defined as follows.
U(δ,a) = {m ∈ Ma | MD(m) = l1 ∧ . . . ∧ ln → l,
{l1, . . . , ln} ⊆ Sa(δ) and l ∈ Sa(δ)}
U(δ,o) = {m ∈ Mo ∪ {m′ ∈ M | +o(m′) ∈ So(δ)} |
MD(m) = l1 ∧ . . . ∧ ln → l and
{l1, . . . , ln} ⊆ So(δ) and l ∈ So(δ) }
• A decision profile δa ∪ δo is optimal for normative sys-
tem o if and only if there is no decision of the normative
system δ′o such that U(δa ∪ δo,o) >o U(δa ∪ δ′o,o).
• A decision profile δa∪ δo is optimal for agent a and nor-
mative system o if and only if it is optimal for normative
system o and there is no decision δ′a such that for all
decision profiles δa∪δ′′o and δ′a∪δ′o optimal for normative
system o we have U(δa ∪ δ′′o ,a) >a U(δ′a ∪ δ′o,a).
Negotiation games involving all three agents a, b and o
can be defined analogously. For example, to find out whether
agent a will fulfill its obligations, agent b has to consider
his beliefs about agent a’s beliefs about normative system o,
extending the violation game with another level of recursion.
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Fig. 2. An example of the game between agent a and organization o.
B. Example
The violation game concerns a trade contract that creates the
obligation to pay for shipped goods, enforced by a sanction,
and the constitutive rule saying that the bill of lading counts
as the institutional fact that the goods have been shipped,
as discussed in Example 5 and 6. The extensive game tree
visualized in Figure 2 is based on the rules discussed in the
examples thus far, together with additional rules and priorities
among rules discussed below. Both agent a and organization o
believe that agent a has already signed the contract and the
bill of lading bill ∈ P has been issued.
{b22  → sign, b23  → bill} ⊆ Ba
{b24  → sign, b25  → bill} ⊆ Bo
For agent a, not being sanctioned has a higher priority than
not paying. For organization o, in case of conflict counting
behavior as a violation has a higher priority than not doing
so, and sanctioning violations has a higher priority than not
doing so.
{shipped→ ¬san} >a { → ¬pay}
{shipped ∧ ¬pay→ Va(¬pay), } >o { → ¬Va(¬pay)}
{shipped ∧ Va(¬pay) → san} >o {shipped→ ¬san}
. . .
Figure 2 should be read as follows. The branches represent
decisions of the agents. Real agent a ∈ RA has two alter-
natives, to pay or not to pay. Organization o ∈ SA has four
alternatives, to count agent a’s behavior as a violation or not,
and to sanction it or not. A complete path from left to right thus
represents a decision profile. The leaves of the tree represent
the belief extensions of the agents for the related decision
profile, calculated using the input/output logic. As discussed in
Examples 5 and 6, the believed consequences of the normative
system contain the legal effects of the contract, represented
by a set of additions. It also includes the consequences of the
added constitutive norm, leading to the occurrence of shipped
in some nodes. The rightmost column represents the unfulfilled
desires and goals, calculated by considering for each relevant
rule whether the body of the rule is implied by the believed
effects of the decision, without the head being implied. For
the normative system also the added rules of the contract
are considered, occurring as the unfulfilled desires and goals
in the right most column of the figure. The viewpoint of
organization o is visualized in rectangular boxes on the bottom
and the top, and the viewpoint of agent a is in between.
The violation games adopt the viewpoint of agent a deciding
whether to pay its fee or not, for which it recursively models
the organization o ∈ Aa. For each node we visualize the
optimal decision in boldface. Consider first the viewpoint of
the organization visualized in rectangular boxes. The top four
lines indicate that if agent a pays, then it does not count it
as a violation and does not sanction the agent (organization o
prefers profile o4 to profiles o1 − o3), and the bottom four
lines indicate that if agent a does not pay, then it sanctions
the agent (organization o prefers profile o5 to profiles o6−o8).
Consequently agent a can choose among only profile a4 and
profile a5, of which it chooses profile a4. Note that the belief
extensions and unfulfilled motivations of a1− a3 and a6− a8
do not have to be calculated to obtain this result.
The example illustrates why the definition of obligation
contains six clauses. Clauses 2-6 are all necessary to derive
that selfish agent a will fulfill the obligation. Clause 1 of the
definition is not necessary in this example, but it is used to
derive the same result for respectful agents internalizing the
goals of the normative system as their own goals. There are
many ways in which the example can be modified such that
no longer can be derived that agent a will pay, including many
subtle variants of fraud and deception.
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VI. RELATED WORK
In this paper we use a qualitative game-theoretic approach
different from the classical quantitative one based on utility
functions, probability distributions, and equilibria analysis.
Starting with the pioneering work of Herbert Simon and
others in the 50s, many alternative conceptualizations and
formalizations of decision making have been proposed in
artificial intelligence and agent theory as a response to the
ideality assumptions of classical decision and game theory.
For example, utility functions have been replaced by goals and
desires, probability functions by beliefs, and decision rules
by a process of deliberation. See Dastani et al. [27] for a
comparison between classical decision and game theory and
alternative qualitative theories developed in artificial intelli-
gence and agent theory.
More complex games have been defined for normative
multiagent systems introduced in this paper. Due to space
limitations, in this paper we only consider two stage games.
In [28] we define games with multiple agents and multiple
stages, but without contracts or self-modification. Based on
a hierarchy, agents model the behavior of the next agent in
the hierarchy. Moreover, in [29] we define norm creation
games from the viewpoint of the normative system recursively
modelling an agent to find out whether it will violate the
new norm, which just like negotiation games extend violation
games with another level of recursion.
Moreover, normative multiagent systems have been studied
which are in some aspects more general than the one used in
this paper. For example, in [28] we define multiple normative
systems playing the role of local and global authorities. The
central question concerning the interaction among normative
systems is how the global authority uses global policies to
control the local authorities with their local policies. The local
authorities are again not forced but motivated, for which we
consider a kind of nested obligations and permissions.
There are several other issues in normative multiagent
systems relevant for the game-theoretic approach to contracts.
In [30] we study how sanctions are negotiated among agents
in the context of negotiating the distribution of obligations.
Instead of defining obligations as a set of explicitly given goals
and desires, we can also use an input/output logic to state that
the mental attitudes logically follow from the mental states of
the agents. Moreover, permissions, prohibitions and reward-
based obligations can be defined in terms of motivational
attitudes in a similar way. A first version of our formal model
of self-modifying normative multiagent systems can be found
in [31], and a preliminary formalization of our game theoretic
approach to contracts can be found in [32].
There are several other proposals to formalize contracts in
the area of multiagent systems. Inspired by Sandholm and
Lesser [33], Teague and Sonenberg [34] discuss the impact
on reputation of levelled commitment contracts, i.e., contracts
where each party can decommit by paying a predeterminate
penalty. While reputation is beyond the scope of this paper,
our model of contracts can specify not only decommitment
penalties, but also explicit procedures for the agents to with-
draw from the contract by means of constitutive rules.
Pacheco and Carmo [4] and Dignum et al. [1] define the
clauses of a contract as conditional obligations, whereas we
use constitutive rules creating obligations when the contract
is created or when another relevant event happens. Dignum et
al. propose the language LCR for modelling contracts. They
define contracts as tuples composed of agents, contract clauses,
stages and interactional structure. They also give a definition
of obligations in terms of violations, but they do not take a
subjective perspective and they do not consider the decision
problem of an agent subject to obligations.
Daskalopulu and Maibaum [35] model contracts as pro-
cesses having states representing the legal relations among
agents. They introduce obligations as consequences of the un-
fulfillment of other obligations. However, they do not consider
the role of constitutive rules in contracts and the fact that
violations are recognized only as an effect of the activity of
the normative system.
Vasconcelos et al. [36], [37] and others call normative
systems regulating the normative position of a multiagent
system e-institutions. E-institutions establish interaction con-
ventions and social consequences of actions, and enforce the
satisfaction of commitments. These concepts could receive a
foundation in terms of legal institutions as we propose in this
paper.
Besides deontic logic, other formalisms have been proposed
to model contracts, for example, Petri nets [38] and state
transition graphs [2].
In the context of e-business Hanson and Milosevic [3]
propose a framework for dealing with several aspects of
contracts, from negotiation to validation, from monitoring
the execution to recovering from violations. As discussed in
Section I, we agree with Milosevic and Dromey [18] that
a specification of an organization given by contract differs
significantly from a computational specification in that the
compliance cannot be taken for granted. Even if Milosevic
and Dromey [18] are aware that contracts are not exhausted
by obligations and permissions, they define them only in terms
of deontic concepts. Our view of contracts as legal institutions
emphasizes the role of constitutive norms besides regulative
ones. Hanson and Milosevic [3] define contract negotiation
as a process of making and adjusting offers among potential
agents willing to be involved in an economic transaction -
until an agreement is reached or the process is terminated
without an agreement. We adopt a similar perspective on
contract negotiation and we focus our work on the problem of
evaluating offers according to the commitments made by the
agents and the procedures created by constitutive norms.
Besides works on modelling contracts, a large literature
is devoted to the problem of the automated negotiation of
contracts, and, in particular, to provide protocols of interaction
which are self enforcing and have desirable properties, like,
for example, the maximization of the sum of the outcomes of
the agents [33], [39], [40]. This topic is beyond the scope
of this paper focusing on reasoning about contracts rather
than on searching the space of possible contracts. Many
works assume that the execution of the contract is carried out
without violations. This assumption is too strong, as noticed
by Milosevic and Dromey [18].
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS – PART C: APPLICATIONS AND REVIEWS, VOL. X, NO. XX, XX 20XX 12
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The role of norms and contracts in the interaction of agents
is a major aspect of e-commerce and e-trading systems. Agents
must reason about the fulfillment of norms, the possible
violations and what to do to repair such violations. However,
classical game and decision theory presume a fixed set of
interaction possibilities. Since contracts can be used to change
the interaction possibilities, norms and contracts pose an
important challenge to the game theoretic analysis of agent
interactions. In this paper we explain and formalize how agents
can modify the behavior of normative systems via contracts.
Our approach to modify the behavior of normative systems
by means of contracts is based on constitutive rules changing
the normative system, using the distinction between regulative
and constitutive norms developed by Searle [8], and the
concept of legal institutions as developed by Ruiter [9]. Legal
effects of actions of the members of a legal system are
complex and contracts do not concern only the regulative
aspects of a legislation, i.e., the rules of behavior specified
by obligations, or the constitutive part of it, i.e., the rules
introducing institutional facts such as bidding in an auction,
but contracts are systems of regulative and constitutive rules
that provide frameworks for social action within larger rule-
governed settings. Therefore contracts as legal institutions
bring with them constitutive norms creating not only institu-
tional facts, but creating also new regulative and constitutive
norms. In this way, it is possible to specify in a contract new
procedures for the interaction among agents.
The game theoretic approach to contracts we develop in this
paper builds on the notion of strategic interaction developed
by Goffman. Inspired by Goffman we adopt the idea that
agents can play games with normative systems just as they
play games with other agents, thus modeling the normative
system as a socially constructed agent, and inspired by Searle
we represent the regulative norms and constitutive norms
as motivational and informational attitudes of this socially
constructed agent. This leads to a relatively simple model of
a complex social phenomena, which can be further developed
in agent theory to develop e-commerce and e-trading systems.
Moreover, we introduce a qualitative game theory based on
recursive modelling.
Our formalization distinguishes between the structure of
normative multiagent systems and games played in it. Starting
from Boella and Lesmo [12]’s observation that a normative
system behaves like an agent monitoring and sanctioning
violations, we develop an ontology of social reality, including
not only normative systems but also groups and organizations.
This ontology is based on the idea that social entities can
be modelled as agents which are attributed mental attitudes.
The metaphor allows us to define regulative rules as goals
of the normative system and constitutive rules as its beliefs.
We introduce self-modifying normative multiagent systems
to define constitutive norms with legal effects, which update
the beliefs and motivations of the normative system. In these
normative multiagent systems, obligations are defined using
six clauses, distinguishing among the motivational and regu-
lative constituents of obligations. The creation of contracts is
represented by an institutional fact that works as an abstraction
between the agreement and its legal effects. Contracts seen as
legal institutions are based on a tight integration of constitutive
and regulative rules.
Moreover, we develop a qualitative game theory where
agents are allowed to make contracts to change their normative
positions, and we explain and show how agents can use
the game theory. By using recursive modelling and applying
the agent metaphor to normative systems we define violation
games among an agent and the normative system in which the
agent predicts the behavior of normative systems, and we use
an example from international trade to illustrate how agents
can use the game theory. Negotiation games involving for
example all three agents a, b and o can be defined analogously.
For example, assume that agent b also has to sign the contract
before it comes into force, and it is deliberating whether to
sign it or not. One of the crucial factors in signing is whether
agent b believes that agent a will fulfill its obligations, or
violate them. Agent b therefore recursively models agent a.
However, to find out whether agent a will fulfill its obligations,
agent b has to consider his beliefs about agent a’s beliefs about
organization o, as detailed in the violation game discussed
in Section V-B. The negotiation game therefore extends the
violation game with another level of recursion.
The qualitative game theory is not restricted to selfish
agents minimizing their sanctions, based on clauses 2-6 of the
definition of obligation, but it can also be used for respectful
agents internalizing the goals of the normative system as their
own goals, based on clause 1. The example also suggests many
ways in which the example can be modified such that no longer
can be derived that agent a will pay, including many subtle
variants of fraud and deception.
In this paper we use normative system and organization
interchangeably, though there are several additional issues
to be studied in organizations. For example, as Milosevic
and Dromey [18] suggest, contracts are strictly related to
roles. Contracts are used for assigning roles: they create the
obligations of the holder of a role starting from the description
of the role. The notion of role allows also to structure the
normative system in various types of agents, like those with
the task of monitoring violations and applying sanctions.
Analogously new roles can be added to normative systems
regulating the contract negotiation process to act as mediators
or coordinators of contracts. Legal institutions, like contracts,
can even create new normative systems, for example, contracts
creating organizations (such as the legislation on societies).
It is thus necessary that such contracts are able to specify
obligations and permissions about obligations and permissions
created by an organizations.
The use of normative multiagent systems is not restricted
to contract negotiation. Many theories and applications of
multiagent systems such as electronic commerce, virtual com-
munities, theories of fraud and deception, of trust dynamics
and reputation, secure knowledge management, et cetera, can
fruitfully employ the notion of a normative system regulating
an agent society. Each of these applications comes with its own
characteristic properties, which are subject of further research.
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